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Does campaign contact influence individuals’ vote choices? 
An alternative approach 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Analyses of local campaign effects are dominated by aggregate-level analyses of 
constituency activity. Though individual-level data are available on whether voters are (or 
remember being) contacted by parties during campaigns, their analysis is fraught with 
difficulties, not least the extent to which memory of campaign contact is itself conditioned 
partly on party allegiance, creating a circularity in the analysis of the impact of party contact 
on vote choice. To some degree, this can be (and has been) dealt with in a regression 
framework. However, this does not fully deal with the potential difficulties. Ideally, 
experimental approaches are needed to tease out definitively the effects of campaign 
exposure on individual’s election decisions. However, these present practical difficulties. In 
this paper, therefore, we utilise quasi-experimental difference-in-difference and propensity 
score matching methods to estimate campaign effects at the 2010 British General Election 
from individual-level data. 
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The constituency campaign effects literature in Great Britain is dominated by aggregate, 
constituency-level analyses (e.g. Johnston et al., 2011). As a result of this research, it is now 
widely accepted that spatially-varying local campaigns pay electoral dividends for parties. 
However, while the aggregate relationship is well-established, demonstrating the micro-
foundations of the constituency campaign is more problematic: how might we uncover the 
impact of the local campaign on individual voters?  
 
Most attempts to do so utilise data from election surveys which ask respondents whether they 
were contacted by individual parties’ constituency campaigns during the election. Those 
reporting being contacted by a party are, other things being equal, more likely to vote for that 
party than are those who do not report such contacts (e.g. Denver et al., 2004; Pattie and 
Johnston, 2010; Clarke et al., 2004, 2009; Johnston, Cutts et al., 2012). What is more, self-
reported measures of campaign contact correlate well with other measures of campaign 
intensity, suggesting they are good indicators of exposure to the campaign: voters are more 
likely to report being contacted by a party during an election campaign if they live in a 
constituency where that party mounted an intense campaign than where its campaign was less 
active (Pattie et al., 1994; Denver et al., 2004; Johnston, Pattie et al., 2012).  
 
Using self-reported campaign exposure raises serious methodological problems, however, as 
respondents’ recollections of being contacted during a campaign are not independent of their 
partisan leanings. On the contrary, individuals are more likely to remember being contacted 
by a party they already support than by one they do not favour. This introduces a threat of 
substantial selection biases: any apparent correlation between self-reported contact from a 
campaign and vote may simply be an artefact of the tendency for those already pre-disposed 
to a party (and hence likely to vote for it anyway) to be the most likely to remember being 
contacted by it. 
 
Although there is extensive evidence of substantial campaign effects in Great Britain through 
aggregate analyses, therefore, there is a need for more robust micro-level foundations. One 
strategy which would get around the selection bias difficulties inherent in conventional 
observational survey research would be to employ large-scale field experiments, similar to 
those now widely used to analyse non-partisan get-out-the-vote measures (see e.g. Green and 
Gerber, 2004). Unfortunately, these are more difficult to conduct where there are partisan 
implications. But it is possible, with careful analysis of well-constructed individual survey 
instruments, to move beyond aggregate studies and to attack the problem through alternative 
individual-level approaches. In this paper, we do so by applying both a difference-in-
difference (DiD) approach and propensity score matching (PSM) methods to individual-level 
survey data. For reasons discussed further in the paper, our preference is for the DiD 
approach, but we employ PSM to provide an alternative cross-check of the DiD results. 
 
Dealing with endogeneity 
 
A key problem in using survey data to analyse the impact of campaign activity is the 
endogeneity of self-reported party campaign contact and vote intention. That endogeneity can 
arise for at least two different reasons. First, parties use their canvassing activities to build 
databases recording electors’ likely vote choices. This information allows them to focus on 
mobilising potential supporters come the general election, while avoiding contact with those 
unlikely to support the party. A simple correlation between contact and vote, therefore, might 
merely reflect how effectively parties identify those already leaning towards them. Second, 
individuals may be more likely to remember being contacted by parties they already support 
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than by parties they do not, so that self-reported campaign contact measures may exaggerate 
the impact of campaign activity on vote choice. The potential scale of the issue can be gauged 
using data from the 2010 British Election Study Campaign Internet Panel Study (BES CIPS), 
which interviewed a large national sample before, during and after the election campaign 
(13,334 individuals answered both the pre- and post-election waves of the survey: technical 
details of the survey are available via the BES website, at http://bes2009-10.org/). 
Respondents to the post-election wave were asked how they had voted in the election, plus 
whether (and how) they had been contacted by the parties during the campaign. 
 
Our main interest here is in those who reported some form of face-to-face contact with a 
party’s campaign, whether at home or in the street (7% of respondents reported being visited 
at home by Labour and 2% reported being contacted by the party in the street; the equivalent 
figures for contact by the Conservatives were 9% and 3% respectively; for the Liberal 
Democrats, they were 5% and 2%). Both forms of contacting voters are liable to be more 
common in competitive than in uncompetitive seats. What is more, canvassing voters at home 
is often targeted at particular neighbourhoods in the constituency based, increasingly, on 
geodemographic profiling of residents’ characteristics and expenditure habits (Farrell and 
Webb, 2002; Cutts, 2006; Fisher and Denver, 2008).1 This is not always true of other forms 
of contact. Contacts via electronic media in the UK has largely been co-ordinated by the party 
nationally with no necessary linkage to the constituency campaign. And while considerable 
effort was expended on telephone campaigns to complement local canvassing, for instance, 
some telephone calls will have been to party supporters, eliciting financial support, rather 
than to voters in key battleground constituencies. In any case, contact via telephones and new 
social media were comparatively rare in 2010. Leafleting, meanwhile, remains a largely 
locally-organised and funded activity. But the relative ubiquity of campaign leaflets and the 
undoubted tendency for most to move direct from the doormat to the rubbish bin with only 
the most limited of scrutiny by the voter renders exposure to them a rather crude indicator. In 
any case, as discussed below, analyses later in the paper control for party constituency 
spending. As printing costs accounted for 85% of local party expenditure during the 2010 
official ‘short’ campaign (and the bulk of that expenditure was on leaflets and similar 
material), this largely captures the effect of leafleting.2 
 
Our first step is to estimate how much difference face-to-face contact with a party’s campaign 
made to an individual’s chance of voting for the party. Clearly, we cannot simply compare 
support for a party among those who did, and those who did not, report being contacted by it 
during the campaign. Two factors will lead to potentially very substantial over-estimates of 
the campaign effect. First, voters may be more likely to recall being contacted by parties they 
actually voted for than by parties they did not support. Second, parties do not contact all 
voters willy-nilly.  Rather, they focus on two groups in particular in their target seats: known 
supporters, to ensure they turn out to vote (mobilisation); and identified waverers, who might 
be persuaded to vote for the party (conversion). As a result, we would expect substantially 
greater voting for a party among those who did recall a contact with it than among those who 
                                                          
1 The analyses reported below utilise a measure of face-to-face campaigning which combines both contact at 
home and contact in the street. We have also repeated all analyses utilising only reported contact at home. The 
results, not reproduced here, replicate the findings reported in this paper.  
2 We have, however, repeated our analyses with the measures of self-reported campaign contact by each party 
extended to include not only contacts at home or in the street, but also via leaflets. The results, not reported here, 
are entirely consistent with our overall argument. Effect sizes for the more extensive measure of self-reported 
contact are generally smaller than for the face-to-face contact measures. But all are significant and in the 
expected directions. 
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did not, even if there was no independent campaign effect whatever, purely because the 
former group will be pre-disposed to support the party. (In reality, the mobilisation effect – 
ensuring known supporters do turn out – is likely to be very important in the last weeks of an 
election campaign. Conversion of waverers is likely to be much harder during such brief 
contacts – though not impossible, not least among those already inclined towards the party or 
considering a tactical vote – especially for local constituency campaigners.) 
 
So how might we deal with this? The gold standard is randomized field experiments, 
employed with great success in both the US and the UK to look at the impact of get-out-the-
vote campaigns (Green and Gerber, 2004; John and Brannan, 2008; Gerber et al., 2008, 2010; 
Davenport et al., 2010; Panagopoulos, 2010; Fieldhouse et al., 2013). In these studies, 
participants are assigned at random to different groups: a control group which receives no 
encouragement to vote; and at least one experimental group, which is given a get-out-the-vote 
incentive. Whether participants go on to vote or not (but not how they vote) is ascertained 
from official records. And as individuals are randomly assigned to groups, differences in 
turnout between groups can be attributed to the treatments themselves (i.e. to different modes 
of campaigning) rather than to compositional differences in the sorts of individuals in each 
group. 
 
Comparisons of field experiments and conventional surveys employing respondents’ self-
reported exposure to campaigns and votes suggest that the latter very substantially 
overestimate the effectiveness of campaigns (e.g. Vavreck, 2007). In principle, therefore, one 
might consider a similar controlled field experiment to investigate the impact of different 
partisan messages on vote choice in which individuals are randomly assigned to different 
groups, one not being exposed to any party campaign, one canvassed by Labour alone, 
another by the Conservatives only, and so on. (This approach was adopted in pioneering work 
by Bochel and Denver, 1971.) However, while actual turnout can be confirmed, it is not 
possible to ascertain from official election returns which parties particular individuals voted 
for: experimental designs therefore have to rely on self-reported voting in a post-election 
survey. It is notable that those studies which have used randomized field experiments to study 
the effect of campaign contact on vote choice have tended to be conducted in the USA and 
concentrate on relatively low-level elections (e.g. primary elections for the Texas Supreme 
Court; a Midwestern county legislature) and rely either on post-election survey self-reported 
vote or on precinct vote to measure the partisan impact (see e.g. Shaw et al., 2012; Barton et 
al., 2013). A threat of selection bias therefore remains. Furthermore, the prospects of 
obtaining agreement from the political parties to conduct such a study during a UK general 
election (which would require their agreement to give up control of their own campaigns in at 
least some key battleground seats) are, it must be said, limited in the extreme. 
 
An alternative approach is to conduct a laboratory experiment (e.g. Ansolabehere and 
Iyengar, 1995; Norris et al., 1999).  This does allow for genuinely random assignment of 
individuals to treatment groups. However, because they are conducted under laboratory 
conditions rather than in the midst of real elections, such studies suffer from inevitable doubts 
regarding their wider applicability: no matter how carefully constructed the experiment, it 
cannot replicate an actual vote decision as nothing depends on the participants’ opinions. 
There is an obvious concern, therefore, over the results’ face validity. 
 
A quasi-experimental approach 
How can we move forward? Interestingly, Vavreck (2007), while showing that self-reports 
can lead to substantial over-estimates of campaign effects, also suggests a way out: when 
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regression models predicting self-reported turnout from self-reported campaign contact 
control for factors such as interest in politics (which might be related to the tendency to over-
report both voting and exposure to the campaign), the effect sizes become comparable to 
those from randomised experiments. There remain, however, potentially serious problems of 
bias with this standard regression approach and it is not possible within such analyses to 
know how large or small such remaining biases within results are. 
 
In this paper, we use two strategies for the analysis of individual-level campaign effects using 
conventional survey data.3 Both control for potential biases caused by variations between 
treatment and control groups, including possible selection biases. The general approach can 
be illustrated by thinking of how we might estimate the extent to which support for party X 
changes over the course of an election campaign, and in particular whether being contacted 
by that party stimulates support. Ideally, we would follow two groups of voters throughout 
the campaign, one (the treatment group) which is contacted by the party and the other (the 
control) which is not, and measure support for the party before and after the election for both 
groups. Say support for party X among the treatment group rose from 30% to 40% over the 
course of the campaign, while among the control group support rose from 25% to 32% 
(figure 1). A simple estimate of the effect of contact would compare the start- and end-points 
for the treatment group, suggesting its campaign raised X’s vote by 10 percentage points (the 
vertical distance between points A and B in figure 1). But there is no control group against 
which to compare. Perhaps it would be better to compare the post-election levels of support 
for party X in the treatment group with the same for the control group, suggesting a more 
modest campaign effect of 8 percentage points (the vertical distance between D and B in 
figure 1)? But without any campaign contact, support for party X still rose by 7 percentage 
points over the course of the campaign in the control group (from C to D). This suggests that 
some of the increase in support for X among the treatment group might have happened 
anyway. Even if the treatment group had not been contacted, therefore, it is quite possible 
that it, too, would have seen support for X go up by the same amount as in the control group, 
rising from 30% to 37% (represented in figure 1 by the dotted line from A to E). The gap 
between the latter figure and the actual post-election level of support for X (40%) gives us 
our best estimate of the independent effect of the campaign (the gap between E and B in 
figure 1, a 3 percentage point rise), as it removes the general drift in support for the party.4 
 
One way to achieve this is to employ difference-in-difference (DiD) methods (see e.g. 
Burden et al., 2013). The most common DiD application in survey-based studies of campaign 
effects uses a conventional regression model to hold constant other relevant influences on 
vote choice (see e.g. Clarke et al., 2004, 2009; Pattie and Johnston, 2010; Fisher et al., 2011). 
In this paper, we use an alternative DiD method which exploits the fact that each respondent 
to the 2010 BES CIPS was interviewed both before and after the election by including both 
observations as separate cases in the data set, and employs an adapted regression modelling 
approach in which the key variable of interest is an interaction between the time period 
                                                          
3 We have also run similar models using the conventional approach of simple multivariate regression models 
with control variables (available in on-line appendix 1): the results produce campaign contact effects which are 
similar in magnitude to those discussed below. 
4 Formally, we can write the difference-in-difference estimate as 
 
Impact = (Yt1 – Yt0) – (Yc1 – Yc0) 
 
where Yi0 is pre-election probability of voting for a party, Yi1 is the probability of actually voting for it, t is the 
treatment group (those reporting being contacted by the party during the campaign) and c is the control group 
(those who report no contact). 
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(before or after) and exposure to the intervention, in our case campaign contact (Machin et 
al., 2004; Meghir and Palme, 2005; Wilkinson and McLennan, 2012; Ikenwilo, 2013). We 
refer to this as the ‘DiD with interaction’ approach. 
 
We also employ a second method – propensity score matching (PSM) – to cross-check the 
estimates produced by our DiD with interaction approach. PSM uses a somewhat different 
strategy. It builds and uses a propensity score to match individuals exposed to the 
intervention to individuals not exposed to the intervention but otherwise similar across their 
set of modelled characteristics and then assesses the difference in outcomes between the two 
matched groups (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Bryson et al., 2002; Jalan and Ravallion, 2003).  
 
In the absence of data from genuine experimental work both approaches have the potential to 
provide better estimates of campaign effects than the simple ‘conventional regression’ 
approach to statistical control. That said, it should be borne in mind that, throughout these 
analyses, we rely on individuals’ self-reported accounts of their vote intentions before and 
during the ‘official campaign period’ of 4-6 weeks prior to polling day, how they actually 
voted, plus whether (and by who) they were contacted during the campaign, and we have no 
means of externally verifying these self-reports against actual votes or details of party 
canvassing activities. Inevitably, this means we cannot be entirely sure we have completely 
identified the effects of campaign contact 
 
Both of the methods utilised here use regression models at some stage, whether to produce 
the main analysis (DiD with interaction) or as a step towards producing matched samples for 
comparison (PSM). To ensure comparability, therefore, the same explanatory variables are 
used throughout. So what might affect whether an individual reports being contacted face-to-
face by a party during the election campaign? 
 
In part, this will be driven by pre-existing party preferences. Parties concentrate their 
attention on those who already support them, or who are undecided (for instance, floating 
voters, previous abstainers, or new voters), rather than on supporters of their rivals (why 
mobilise those who will vote against you?). Through canvassing before an election they will 
have some idea of who many of these individuals are, or at least the neighbourhoods in which 
most of them live (Johnston, Cutts et al., 2012). In addition, voters are more likely to recall 
being contacted by a party they already support than by one they do not. We therefore control 
for self-reported vote at the previous General Election in 2005 and voters’ party identification 
on the eve of the 2010 election (this also controls for many ‘background’ socio-demographic 
correlates of voting). In addition, parties campaign hardest in those seats in which they face 
the most intense competition and least in seats where they are bound to either lose or win 
(Pattie and Johnston, 2003; Johnston et al., 2013). To capture this we include the amount 
each party spent on its 2010 ‘short campaign’ (the period from the dissolution of Parliament 
to the date of the election) in each respondent’s constituency, expressed as a percentage of the 
legal maximum expenditure permitted there.5 It is also likely that those who actively contact 
their political representatives will be more likely to pay attention to the campaign and to be 
included in parties’ data bases of voters to contact during the campaign compared with voters 
who do not contact politicians. We capture this using a question in the BES pre-election 
                                                          
5 The amount candidates can spend on their constituency campaigns is tightly regulated in UK elections. The 
legally-permitted spending limit in each seat is largely a function of the size of the electorate there. As 
electorates vary from seat to seat, so does the legal maximum. To provide a standardised measure of campaign 
intensity which is not conflated with constituency size, therefore, we express the amount spent by each 
candidate as a percentage of the legal maximum expenditure allowed in their seat. 
Campaign effect pseudo-experiment 7 05/09/2016 
survey wave asking respondents whether they had sought help from their local MP. Finally, 
we expect that parties will be more likely to contact (and the contact to be remembered by) 
those who pay close attention to politics than those who pay little or no attention. This is 
measured by individuals’ pre-election ratings, on an 11-point scale, of how much attention 
they pay to politics (the responses are coded so that high scores indicate most attention). 
 
Tackling selection bias through using difference-in-difference (DiD) with interaction 
 
A conventional approach would be to conduct a regression analysis with vote choice as the 
dependent variable and self-reported campaign contact as the key independent variable, while 
controlling for the various factors identified above. While common and easy to implement, 
however, this comes with a number of problems, not least the risk of selection bias. If self-
reported contact with a party’s campaign and vote choice are both influenced by a common 
factor – for instance, by pre-existing support for the party – there is a risk that the estimator 
for impact of contact on vote might be mis-specified. We need some means of minimising 
this risk. To deal with this, we therefore extend the regression approach by fitting a DiD 
model using interactions.6  
 
At its core, DiD with interaction compares change over time in the behaviour being examined 
for those who are, and those who are not, exposed to some sort of intervention. The 2010 
BES CIPS is well-suited for this as we know vote intention at the start of the campaign and 
actual vote at the election four weeks later on for individuals who are contacted by each party 
and for those who are not.  
 
To fit the DiD with interactions model, the data are structured so that each BES panel 
respondent provides two cases. The first records that individual’s position in the pre-election 
wave, about a month before election day. In that wave individuals were asked whether they 
had decided how they would vote in the upcoming election and, if they had, whether they 
would definitely vote for the party, or were leaning to it, though not yet firmly committed. 
Here, only definite intentions are treated as pre-election support for the party and ‘leaners’ 
are grouped with those who were then thinking of either voting for another party or 
abstaining (11% of the sample said before the campaign that they were either unsure of how 
they wold vote or were intending to abstain; 22% said they were ‘leaning’ towards a party but 
were as yet uncommitted; and 67% said they had definitely decided which party they would 
vote for). Controlling for the ‘definite’ intentions provides a strong test for campaign effects, 
as around 80% of those who said before the start of the campaign that they definitely 
intended voting Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat actually did go on to report doing 
so: by comparison, only 55% of pre-election Labour ‘leaners’ said afterwards that they had 
voted for the party, as did 63% of Conservative and 71% of Liberal Democrat leaners. What 
is more, only a relative handful reported leaning towards each of the major parties (5% for 
Labour, 6% for the Conservatives and 6% for the Liberal Democrats.)7 We use this expressed 
intention as the pre-election score for the dependent variable, vote. The second case for each 
respondent, taken from the post-election wave of the survey, records his or her reported vote, 
with the dependent variable coded to indicate this reported actual vote choice. In addition, 
each case has: a time variable (coded 0 for the pre-election cases and 1 for the post-election 
cases); dummy variables for exposure to each of the three main parties’ face-to-face 
campaigns (coded 1 if the respondent reported being contacted by the party during the 
                                                          
6 See Ashenfelter and Card (1985) and Card and Kreuger (1994) 
7 The model can clearly be run with different specifications of the pre-election vote measure – definite voters 
only, definite voters plus ‘leaners’, and so on. The core results are robust under both specifications.  
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campaign and 0 otherwise: hence in all cases these variables are coded 0 for cases at the start 
of the election campaign); interactions between the time and campaign contact variables; and 
the explanatory variables discussed above. In each model, we include contact and interaction 
terms for reported exposure to the campaign of the party whose vote is being analysed only, 
since this eases comparison with the PSM results discussed in the penultimate section of the 
paper. (The PSM approach is based on estimating the effect of contact by one party at a time: 
it does not allow us to estimate simultaneously the effects of contact by more than one party.) 
However, it should be noted that as all the models reported here already contain variables for 
all three parties’ constituency campaign expenditure, much of the effect of campaigning by 
rival parties has already been factored into the results.  
 
Although the dependent variable is binary in form, we employ OLS regression here. Given 
that interaction terms in logit or probit models are not interpretable in the same way as in 
linear models (Ai and Norton, 2003), and hence would not readily capture the true difference-
in-difference with interaction estimate, the application of linear DiD models to binary 
outcomes is more appropriate and is commonplace in the literature (e.g. Weinick et al., 2000; 
Fu et al., 2007; Liu et al, 2010). We are particularly interested in the coefficients for the 
interaction terms since these are the estimates of the impact of contact on voting, other things 
being equal and after seeking to mitigate the problem of selection biases. 
 
The DiD with interaction model results are shown in table 1. The variables for face-to-face 
contact show that the direct effects of campaign contact on vote are significant and positive in 
all three equations: those who recalled being contacted by a party were more likely to report 
either intending to vote for it before the election or actually doing so on polling day than were 
those who did not recall being contacted. Because the models include the interaction terms, 
the direct effect of campaign contact applies only to the pre-campaign period (where the 
variable for time and hence also the interaction term take values of 0). It shows, therefore, 
that reporting being contacted by a party during the campaign is associated with an intention 
to vote for it at the start of the campaign, either because parties disproportionately target 
those voters already leaning towards them in order to mobilise their supporters, or because 
respondents are more likely to remember being contacted by parties they already support than 
by parties they do not. This may, of course, also reflect longer-term local campaigning by 
parties in the months preceding the calling of the election, and there is evidence suggesting 
that such campaigning does build up support for parties (Cutts, 2006; Johnston et al., 2011; 
Cutts et al., 2012).  
 
However, this is not in itself evidence that face-to-face contact during the campaign makes a 
difference which is the real interest here.  This is measured not by the direct effect of 
campaign contact but, rather, by the interactions between face-to-face contact and time. Two 
of the interaction coefficients, for face-to-face contact by the Labour campaign in the Labour 
vote model and for contact by the Liberal Democrats in the Liberal Democrat vote model, are 
significant at the 0.01 level and in the expected direction. Labour and Liberal Democrat face-
to-face efforts did win them extra support during the campaign, over and above what they 
might have expected before the election. But the equivalent interaction term in the 
Conservative model does not quite reach conventional levels of statistical significance (p = 
0.069), though it is correctly signed. In other words, once we partial out the general drift of 
each party’s support over the course of the campaign only the Labour and Liberal Democrat 
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face-to-face campaigns emerge clearly as electoral assets for their parties.8 We have also run 
analyses containing contact and interaction terms for all three parties’ campaigns (the results 
are available in on-line appendix 2). The results are as expected:  reporting being contacted 
by a party makes voters more likely to report voting for it, and less likely to report voting for 
its rivals. 
 
The effect sizes are noteworthy too, being generally modest, though still respectable. Being 
contacted by Labour or the Liberal Democrats raised an individual’s probability of voting for 
each party by around 0.08 (8 percentage points) compared to a similar individual who was 
not contacted – which is more than enough to make the difference between winning and 
losing in a substantial number of marginal constituencies. 
 
Running a quasi-experiment: propensity score matching (PSM) 
 
To check that these results are not simply an artefact of the DiD with interactions method we 
also use an alternative estimation strategy, propensity score matching (PSM: Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Bryson et al., 2002; Jalan and Ravaillon, 2003). 
Exposure to each party’s face-to-face campaign will never be universal and parties 
concentrate their efforts on contacting individuals who either are liable to vote for them or 
have a reasonable likelihood of being persuaded to do so, especially if they live in marginal 
seats which could easily change hands. But even the best-organised and resourced campaign 
will be unable to contact every individual it may wish to reach. Hence there will be 
individuals who have many of the characteristics of potential supporters the party might wish 
to contact but who will not be contacted. PSM identifies such individuals and matches them 
with ostensibly similar individuals who were contacted (or, in our case, who reported being 
contacted). Given that matched treatment and control individuals are, by definition, designed 
to be similar according to the observable characteristics (though how similar depends on the 
effectiveness of the matching as well as the importance of any unobserved characteristics) the 
effect of the intervention is assumed to be the difference in voting behaviour between the 
matched treatment and control groups. (For a critique of propensity score methods, see e.g. 
Arceneaux et al., 2006, 2010.) 
 
To achieve this matching, our PSM approach uses logit models to predict each respondent’s 
probability of exposure to the campaign (their propensity score) given their set of explanatory 
characteristics.9 Individuals who did report contact are matched with individuals who did not 
but whose propensity scores are similar; in other words, matched individuals are similarly 
likely to report being contacted given their explanatory characteristics, but only one of them 
actually reported being contacted. Various matching algorithms are available: we used single 
nearest neighbour matching (i.e. matching each contacted individual to the one uncontacted 
individual with the nearest propensity score). After the matching process has been completed 
only the treatment (i.e. contacted) and matched control (i.e. uncontacted) cases are retained 
for analyses. This matched sample is similar to a randomised experimental design, in that the 
                                                          
8 In part, this may reflect the tactical situation at the time of the election. The Conservatives were ahead in the 
opinion polls and had by some margin the best-resourced national campaign of the three main parties. Labour, 
meanwhile, was behind and had more limited resources to expend. It expected to lose seats to the Conservatives 
and was concentrating its campaign efforts heavily on holding its most marginal seats. The Liberal Democrats, 
too, had only limited resources to expend on their national campaign, and were focussing on the battle in the 
marginals (both those they held and wanted to retain, and those where they were narrowly behind and hoped to 
gain). 
9 To conduct the PSM we make use of the psmatch2 command in Stata (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). 
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underlying characteristics of the treatment and control groups are designed to be similar 
across the observable characteristics, with the main exception being whether or not they were 
exposed to a party’s face-to-face campaign. That said, the matching process is probabilistic, 
not exact,10 and based inevitably only on observable characteristics available in the data (and 
hence vulnerable to omitted variable biases, which would not be expected with random 
allocation). The harder it is to model the likelihood of receiving the intervention (in our case 
is whether the individual was contacted or not), therefore, the larger the likely margin of error 
in the matching process is likely to be. Because of the potential for imprecision in the 
matching process, even in large probability samples, our inclination is to prefer a DiD to a 
PSM approach here. However, PSM gives us an alternative, and independent, estimate of the 
effects of campaign contact, so at least provides insight into whether our DiD estimates are of 
the right order of magnitude and direction. 
 
Table 2 reports the logit models predicting who reported being contacted by each party’s 
campaign. As expected, those already inclined towards each party (whether as party 
identifiers or past voters) were more likely to recall being contacted by it than were those 
who were not so inclined. Wider engagement with the political process also mattered. 
Respondents who had sought help from their MP were more likely to report being contacted 
by each party’s campaign during the 2010 election than were respondents who had not and in 
addition the more attention individuals paid to politics the more likely they were to report 
being contacted by each party during the campaign. Finally, the more each party spent on its 
constituency campaign in each seat, the more likely individuals living there were to report 
being contacted by that party; countering this, the harder a party’s rivals worked in a seat, the 
more likely voters living there were to report being contacted by those parties. The more the 
Liberal Democrats spent on their local campaign, for instance, the more likely respondents 
were to report being contacted not just by them but also by Labour and the Conservatives. 
Similarly, the harder Labour campaigned, the more likely respondents were to recall being 
contacted by the Conservatives. 
 
These models are used to estimate a propensity score for each respondent which is then used 
to match contacted individuals with others who had a similar chance of being contacted given 
their characteristics but who did not report being contacted. Comparing voting behaviour 
across the matched treatment and control groups provides an alternative robust estimate of 
the impact of face-to-face canvassing on party support (table 3). Among these matched pairs, 
being contacted by a party raises the chances of voting for that party by between 5 and 10 
percentage points over the chances of voting for it having not been contacted. As with the 
DiD models, the effects of campaign contact are larger for the Labour and Liberal Democrat 
than for the Conservative campaigns. Clearly, this is a small effect. But it is far from 
negligible and in a close contest could make all the difference between winning and losing a 
seat. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The analyses reported here confirm the importance of local campaign effort in modern 
elections. Local campaigning pays electoral dividends. Individuals who are contacted by 
parties are more likely to vote for them than are individuals who are not. The methods 
employed here suggest that this is unlikely to be an artefact of survey response biases: no 
matter how we look at the data the same results recur, giving us confidence in their validity. 
                                                          
10 Nor, indeed, random as in a true randomised control trial. 
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However, the parties did not all receive the same rewards for their efforts. Both the DiD with 
interactions and the PSM results suggest Liberal Democrats and especially Labour obtained 
greater returns from their campaign contacts with voters than did the Conservatives. In part, 
this may reflect the long-standing observation that in recent elections the Conservatives tend 
to get fewer returns to their local campaigning than the other parties (e.g. Pattie et al., 1995; 
Denver et al., 2002). But it also reflects the parties’ very different positions in the run-up to 
the 2010 elections (see also Fisher et al., 2011). The Conservatives were by far the best-
resourced party of the three, but had a substantial job to do to win sufficient seats to form a 
government (a feat which would have required one of the largest swings from government to 
opposition of modern times). Their resources were spread widely, therefore. Labour and the 
Liberal Democrats, working in more straightened circumstances, had to focus their campaign 
resources in a relatively few places: that concentration seems to have helped them do 
relatively well where they were able to put up a strong local fight. A relatively effective 
constituency campaign could not compensate Labour for its failings in office. But it does 
seem to have helped Labour contain its losses somewhat. The party would almost certainly 
have gone down to an even more serious loss of its parliamentary base had its local 
campaigns been less effective. 
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Table 1: Predicting the impact of self-reported face to face contact on voting at the 2010 
election: difference-in-difference with time-intervention interaction OLS models with robust 
standard errors (source: 2010 BES Campaign Internet Panel) 
 
 Vote 2010 
 Labour Conservative Liberal 
Democrat 
Vote, 2005 (comparison = did not vote) 
Labour 0.1457** 0.0395** 0.0138 
Conservative -0.0001 0.2336** -0.0104 
Lib Dem -0.0358** 0.0157+ 0.2388** 
Other -0.0035 0.0179+ -0.0116 
Too young 0.0605** 0.0302* 0.0508** 
Don’t know 0.0047 0.0323** 0.0325** 
Party identification, pre-election (comparison = no party ID) 
Very strong Labour identification 0.6716** -0.1485** -0.0882** 
Fairly strong Labour identification 0.4833** -0.1138** -0.0273* 
Not very strong Labour identification 0.2278** -0.0607** 0.0091 
Very strong Conservative identification -0.0568** 0.5953** -0.1106** 
Fairly strong Conservative identification -0.0517** 0.5537** -0.1059** 
Not very strong Conservative identification -0.0553** 0.3744** -0.0666** 
Very strong Liberal Democrat identification -0.0188+ -0.1307** 0.5670** 
Fairly strong Liberal Democrat identification -0.0166+ -0.1067** 0.4781** 
Not very strong Liberal Democrat identification -0.0042 -0.0715** 0.2460** 
Other -0.0199* -0.0382** -0.0442 
Respondent sought help from local MP (comparison = yes) 
No 0.0028 0.0017 -0.0010 
Pre-election attention to politics (10=high) 0.0001 0.0052** -0.0002 
Labour short campaign spend % 0.0004** -0.0001 -0.0003** 
Conservative short campaign spend % -0.0002* 0.0003** 0.0001 
Lib Dem short campaign spend % -0.0002** -0.0001* 0.0005** 
Labour face-to-face campaign contact 0.0386**   
Conservative face-to-face campaign contact  0.0286**  
Lib Dem face-to-face campaign contact   0.0281* 
Time post-election (comparison=pre-election) 0.0308** 0.0503** 0.1412** 
Time*Lab face-to-face campaign contact 0.0772**   
Time*Con face-to-face campaign contact  0.0233+  
Time*LD face-to-face campaign contact   0.0794** 
Constant 0.0359 0.0389 0.0483 
    
R2 0.5108 0.5869 0.3766 
N 23410 23410 23410 
 
+  Significant at p=0.10 
*  Significant at p= 0.05 
**  Significant at p = 0.01 
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Table 2: Propensity score matching stage 1: predicting who should have been contacted face 
to face by parties in the 2010 campaign (logit models. Source: 2010 BES Internet Campaign 
Panel) 
 
 Contacted face-to-face by: 
 Labour Conservative Liberal 
Democrat 
Vote, 2005 (comparison = did not vote) 
Labour 0.390 0.088 0.229 
Conservative 0.026 0.401** 0.074 
Lib Dem -0.169 0.164 0.848** 
Other 0.108 0.064 0.217 
Too young 0.017 0.280 0.481 
Don’t know 0.044 0.033 0.578* 
Party identification, pre-election (comparison = no party ID) 
Very strong Labour identification 1.234** -0.083 0.212 
Fairly strong Labour identification 0.565** 0.145 0.393* 
Not very strong Labour identification 0.565** 0.145 0.215 
Very strong Conservative identification -0.470 0.894** 0.206 
Fairly strong Conservative identification -0.332 0.655* 0.066 
Not very strong Conservative identification -0.152 0.436** 0.164 
Very strong Liberal Democrat identification -0.109 -0.353 1.707** 
Fairly strong Liberal Democrat identification 0.080 0.054 0.746** 
Not very strong Liberal Democrat identification 0.244 0.282 0.642** 
Other 0.165 -0.020 0.014 
Respondent sought help from local MP (comparison = yes) 
No -0.362** -0.127* -0.148* 
Pre-election attention to politics (10=high) 0.058** 0.098** 0.062** 
Labour short campaign spend % 0.019** 0.004** 0.002 
Conservative short campaign spend % -0.000 0.013** 0.002 
Lib Dem short campaign spend % 0.004** 0.003** 0.017** 
Constant -4.187 -4.416 -4.669 
    
-2 log likelihood    
Improvement 754.39 517.94 629.44 
Sig 0.000 0.000 0.000 
% correctly classified    
Nagelkerke R2 0.107 0.059 0.102 
N 12598 12598 12598 
 
+  Significant at p=0.10 
*  Significant at p= 0.05 
**  Significant at p = 0.01 
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Table 3: Propensity score matching results: the effect of face-to-face contact on voting for a 
party in 2010 
 
Party Labour Conservatives Liberal 
Democrat 
Contacted by party: % voting for party 53.1 52.7 49.8 
Not contacted by party: % voting for party 42.7 47.7 40.0 
Difference 10.4 5.0 9.8 
SE 2.4 2.0 2.6 
T 4.38** 2.44* 3.80** 
N 2028 2820 1670 
 
*  Significant at p= 0.05 
**  Significant at p = 0.01 
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Figure 1: A hypothetical illustration of difference-in-difference estimation 
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On-line appendices 
On-line appendix 1: Predicting the impact of self-reported face to face contact on voting at 
the 2010 election: conventional regression: OLS models with robust standard errors (source: 
2010 BES Campaign Internet Panel) 
 
 Vote 2010 
 Labour Conservative Liberal 
Democrat 
Vote, 2005 (comparison = did not vote) 
Labour 0.1793** 0.0505** 0.0422** 
Conservative -0.0052 0.2872** -0.0143 
Lib Dem -0.0455** 0.0235+ 0.3038** 
Other 0.0042 0.0366* -0.0074 
Too young 0.0613* 0.0472* 0.0628* 
Don’t know 0.0198 0.0937** 0.0806** 
Party identification, pre-election (comparison = no party ID) 
Very strong Labour identification 0.5669** -0.2011** -0.1935** 
Fairly strong Labour identification 0.4078** -0.1571** -0.0903** 
Not very strong Labour identification 0.2095** -0.0952** -0.0017 
Very strong Conservative identification -0.0944** 0.4885** -0.2089** 
Fairly strong Conservative identification -0.0875** 0.4702** -0.1980** 
Not very strong Conservative identification -0.0919** 0.3591** -0.1193** 
Very strong Liberal Democrat identification -0.0500** -0.1805** 0.3960** 
Fairly strong Liberal Democrat identification -0.0431** -0.1509** 0.3740** 
Not very strong Liberal Democrat identification -0.0242 -0.0973** 0.2469** 
Other -0.0399** -0.0460** -0.0854** 
Respondent sought help from local MP (comparison = yes) 
No -0.0042 0.0021 0.0053 
Pre-election attention to politics (10=high) -0.0006 0.0070** 0.0003 
Labour short campaign spend % 0.0007** -0.0000 -0.0005** 
Conservative short campaign spend % -0.0003** 0.0005** 0.0002 
Lib Dem short campaign spend % -0.0005** -0.0002* 0.0008** 
Labour face-to-face campaign contact 0.1141**   
Conservative face-to-face campaign contact  0.0526**  
Lib Dem face-to-face campaign contact   0.0935** 
Constant 0.1102 0.0757 0.2098 
    
R2 0.4802 0.5623 0.3330 
N 12155 12155 12155 
 
+  Significant at p=0.10 
*  Significant at p= 0.05 
**  Significant at p = 0.01 
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On-line appendix 2: Predicting the impact of self-reported face to face contact on voting at 
the 2010 election: difference-in-difference with time-intervention interaction for all three 
parties: OLS models with robust standard errors (source: 2010 BES Campaign Internet Panel) 
 
 Vote 2010 
 Labour Conservative Liberal 
Democrat 
Vote, 2005 (comparison = did not vote) 
Labour 0.1455** 0.0403** 0.0146 
Conservative 0.0022 0.2309** -0.0088 
Lib Dem -0.0343** 0.0158+ 0.2383** 
Other -0.0048 0.0178+ -0.0101 
Too young 0.0588** 0.0305* 0.0508** 
Don’t know 0.0042 0.0323** 0.0340** 
Party identification, pre-election (comparison = no party ID) 
Very strong Labour identification 0.6735** -0.1433** -0.0841** 
Fairly strong Labour identification 0.4834** -0.1110** -0.0259* 
Not very strong Labour identification 0.2294** -0.0594** 0.0098 
Very strong Conservative identification -0.0521** 0.5910** -0.1081** 
Fairly strong Conservative identification -0.0498** 0.5522** -0.1049** 
Not very strong Conservative identification -0.0552** 0.3741** -0.0655** 
Very strong Liberal Democrat identification -0.0143 -0.1266** 0.5735** 
Fairly strong Liberal Democrat identification -0.0174+ -0.1045** 0.4788** 
Not very strong Liberal Democrat identification -0.0023 -0.0695** 0.2447** 
Other -0.0203* -0.0375** -0.0443** 
Respondent sought help from local MP (comparison = yes) 
No 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0019 
Pre-election attention to politics (10=high) 0.0003 0.0054** -0.0001 
Labour short campaign spend % 0.0004** -0.0000 -0.0002** 
Conservative short campaign spend % -0.0001 0.0002** 0.0001 
Lib Dem short campaign spend % -0.0001* -0.0001 0.0004** 
Labour face-to-face campaign contact 0.0291** -0.0251** -0.0064 
Conservative face-to-face campaign contact -0.0219** 0.0340** -0.0036 
Lib Dem face-to-face campaign contact -0.0027 -0.0149* 0.0094 
Time post-election (comparison=pre-election) 0.0331** 0.0453** 0.1386** 
Time*Lab face-to-face campaign contact 0.0742** -0.0020 -0.0584** 
Time*Con face-to-face campaign contact -0.0203* 0.0503** -0.0438** 
Time*LD face-to-face campaign contact -0.0424** -0.0360** 0.1286** 
Constant 0.0317** 0.0442** 0.0447** 
    
R2 0.5120 0.5886 0.3819 
N 23410 23410 23410 
 
+  Significant at p=0.10 
*  Significant at p= 0.05 
**  Significant at p = 0.01 
 
